This paper analyses the role that the green wedges idea played in the main official reconstruction plans for London, namely the County of London Plan 1943 and the Greater London Plan 1944. Green wedges were theorised in the first decade of the twentieth century and discussed in multifaceted ways up to the end of the Second World War. Despite having been prominent in many plans for London, they have been largely overlooked in planning history. This paper argues that green wedges were instrumental in these plans to the formulation of a more modern, sociable, healthier and greener peacetime London.
Introduction
Green wedges have been theorised as an essential part of planning debates since the beginning of the twentieth century. Their prominent position in texts and plans rivalled that of the green belt, despite the comparatively disproportionate attention given to the latter by planning historians (see, for example, Purdom, 1945, 151; Freestone, 2003, 67-98; Ward, 2002, 172; Sutcliffe, 1981a; Amati and Yokohari, 1997, 311-37) .
From the mid-nineteenth century, the provision of green spaces became a fundamental aspect of modern town planning (Dümpelmann, 2005, 75; Dal Co, 1980, 141-293) . In this context, the green wedges idea emerged as a solution to the need to provide open spaces for growing urban areas, as well as to establish a direct green belt, which was criticised for not addressing the need for urban green spaces and for immobilizing the urban structure.
The history of green wedges in Britain in the period goes alongside the development of regionalism. Regional planning had already been promoted at the RIBA Conference by G. L. Pepler and A. Crow The inter-war period saw regional planning flourish in Britain, influenced mainly by the works of Geddes, Pepler, Crow, Unwin and Abercrombie (Hewitt, 2011, 560) .
Also during this period, green wedges were used in plans in numerous countries across the world, such as Australia, Germany, Cuba and Brazil. In Britain, the idea gained momentum with the publication of 'Open Spaces' by Pepler (1923) , in which a diagram including four green wedges and a circular parkway linking them up formed a model for park system plans. They would be essential in the promotion of healthy environments by enlarging the amount of open space inside cities and funnelling in fresh air from the countryside. In both reports of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC), from 1929 and 1933, green wedges were incorporated into the plans, linking the green belt to London's core. Abercrombie in his book Town and Country republished Pepler's diagram as a model for park system plans (1933, 147) . By that time, the initial theoretical opposition between belt and wedges in Britain had been resolved and they were promoted, in many cases, as complementary elements of citywide or regional park systems. These plans and texts announced the further use that green wedges would have in plans made during and after the war in the country.
The context of post-war reconstruction
While the inter-war period had seen the growth of regional plans and claims for the preservation of the countryside (Sheail, 1981) ; reconstruction of war-damaged towns, construction of new settlements and the move towards the coordination of town and country planning became priorities in the post-war period (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011, 55-79) .
Lord Reith, the Minister of Works and Planning between 1940 and given the responsibility to work on reconstruction policy to make viable the replanning of existing towns and cities. The most fundamental questions at issue were those related to the private ownership of land and to planning itself.
Regarding the first, professionals such as D.E. Gibson, City Architect of Coventry, would argue for 'some form of nationalisation of the land' as the 'only solution for Britain ' (1940, 579) because, as fellow commentator A.W. Crampton asserted: 'the private ownership of land [was] the cause that fetters modern development ' (1941, 4-5) . Another notable claim for such a move can be found in the argument of the Director of the Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics at Oxford University, C.S. Orwin, that 'whatever way the problem is regarded, it seems impossible to be fair to the community so long as private property in land persists' and that 'acquisition of the freehold of the land by the State … must be accepted as a prerequisite of planning control' (The Builder, 1942b, 333) . In January 1941 Reith established the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, the Uthwatt Committee, which although not as bold as some expected, formulated a legal framework to support the compulsory purchase of areas needed for reconstruction plans.
Secondly, the question of planning involved the move towards the decentralisation of population and industry away from congested areas, the coordination between town and country planning, and the establishment of visionary plans. In this context, the Barlow Report, published in 1940 by the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Industrial Population, outlined the principles of the reduction of population from congested areas and the decentralisation of industry. It presented an opportunity to promote national planning and to consider more efficiently how to control land use (Moore, 2012, 3) . Soon Reith created the Consultative Panel on Physical Reconstruction, a panel of twenty-one expert advisers, which included names such as Abercrombie, Barlow, Osborn and Stamp (Bullock, 2002, 14 and NA HLG 86/7, 1941-2) . In 1942, the Report of the Committee of Land Utilisation in Rural Areas, known as the Scott Report (Ministry of Works and Planning, 1942) , defended a better coordination of town and country planning and stressed the need to preserve agricultural land.
The most intensive period of bombing in Britain occurred between September 1940 and May 1941. The destruction of housing was most noticeable, but losses covered a wide range of building types (Flinn, 2012, 226) . The end of the Blitz opened up a scenario of hope and enthusiasm, in which planning for the future became an exciting opportunity (Ashworth, 1954, 227; Tiratsoo, 2000, 34; Hasegawa, 1999, 138; Bullock, 2002, 5) . This can be seen for instance in H. V. Lanchester's model for reconstruction to be applied to large cities, summarised in a diagram from the end of 1941 (see Figure 1 ). This is a development of his 1908 and 1910 diagrams and illustrated the city core, four green wedges and four built-up areas. Ralph Tubb's (Marmaras and Sutcliffe, 1994, 434) 'without paying much attention to existing town planning law' (Carter and Goldfinger, 1945) as a new legal framework was being formulated. Still in 1941, Reith lectured in many bombed cities, such as Coventry, Southampton, Plymouth and Portsmouth, encouraging local governments to 'plan boldly ' and 'comprehensively' (See Essex and Brayshay, 2008, 437-61; Hasegawa, 1992) . London's uncontrolled urban and population growth had been a cause for concern for over a century. At the city scale, this had led to inner-urban problems, such as overcrowding, lack of green spaces and their ill-distribution (see Figure 4) , an obsolete road system, unsanitary conditions, inadequacy of housing supply, and a haphazard mixture of incompatible land uses (LMA LMA4062/06/040, 1943) . At the regional scale, the absence of a plan had allowed ribbon development to stretch far out into the countryside, urbanising the neighbouring areas and suburbanising towns.
Only a month into the Blitz, the LCC was already discussing alternatives for the future of the capital. The minutes of a meeting held on 7 October 1940 evidenced the two main alternatives: rebuild London as it was-as had been done after the Great Fire of London of 1666-or 'redevelop the whole of London on an ideal scheme'. Lewis Silkin, who was then an MP and would later become Minister of Town and Country Planning, urged the council to be visionary, stating that 'London must not be rebuilt as it was before the war. We had (sic) a great opportunity and we must take it' (LMA CL/TP/1/33, 1940b, 2). Lord Latham (1942, 421-3) , the Leader of the LCC, also corroborated the view that London should not incur the same 'mistake' twice: 'Wren's great plan for the City, after the Fire, was never put into execution. Clashes between irreconcilable interests supervened. Neither this nor any other condition must be allowed to prevent the carrying out of the twentieth-century plan of London'. The Indeed, according to Abercrombie and Forshaw (1943, 42) , the park system plan for the County was 'a practical application of the theory of the green wedges' (see The perceived need for more green spaces and their coordination into a linked system was presented as a response to a number of considerations. Firstly, they would allow for a more spacious-and therefore healthier and more modern-environment.
This would guarantee an adequate influx of fresh air and access to sunlight, and provide recreational spaces throughout the entire county. Secondly, and mostly through the use of green wedges, they would create a direct connection to the countryside. Thirdly, wedges of greenery would help form the proposed community boundaries and establish buffer zones along lines of traffic.
Having in mind that the tuberculosis death-rate and the infant mortality rate in London were 50% higher than, for instance, the average of the boroughs and urban districts in Hertfordshire (Reiss, 1943, 254) combined with works in infrastructure, 'will result in less land remaining available for housing'; a significant amount of industry would also 'have to go too'. By the time of the plan's preparation, the publication of the Barlow Report signalled that the redistribution of population and industries away from London would be carried forward and that of the Uthwatt Report indicated that the matter of compensation would not necessarily be an impediment to executing the new plan. This meant, respectively, that London could be replanned much more 'spaciously'-as it would accommodate fewer people (LMA CL/TP/1/34, 1944, 4)-and that large-scale moves, which would be convenient, for instance, for the update of the traffic system and the creation of large green spaces, would not be an irresolvable matter due to litigation over compulsory purchase of land. This legal framework forged the initial conditions of existence for the application of the green wedges idea for London, although more powers would be necessary for their full realisation.
Many commentators have already pointed to the influence of the Barlow Report on
Abercrombie's views regarding stopping sprawl by the means of a green belt (See, for example, Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2011, 64) . However, it is to be reinforced that the plan was clear in stating what the limits of the green belt alone were, and that the focus should be on a conjoined approach: 'the Green Belt and surrounding countryside need bringing more into the centre through green wedges formed by the existing undeveloped public land' (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, 38) while parkways along the ring roads would give access from one wedge to another. The park system was to be organised on different scales and create a framework starting from the smallest and most local open spaces to the forest reserves in the countryside.
In essence, the plan's ambition was that the dweller could get from doorstep to open country through an easy flow of open space: 'from garden to park, from park to parkway, from parkway to green wedge and from green wedge to Green Belt' (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, 39 ) (see Figure 6 ). (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, 39-40) . The green wedges are loosely represented in the drawings and require some imagination to be fully visualised; nonetheless, it is important to note how much emphasis was put on trying to make the idea work without a hyper-extensive programme of demolitions and making it the centrepiece of the park system plans.
The contemporary recurrent theme of linking green spaces with the traffic system (Lemes de Oliveira, 2014, 360-2) was adopted in the LCC Plan. For Forshaw (1943, 15) , 'an essential protection the community needs is against the danger and noise of through traffic-a protection to be secured by a precinctal arrangement of roads or the presence of open spaces and green wedges as buffers between built-up areas'.
Greenery would be buffer zones between the communities, encouraging their identity and breaking up the urban form. Most importantly, green wedges would help separate residential areas from the main lines of traffic, as well as from areas of unwanted proximity such as factories.
It was anticipated that allotments would become a 'war necessity' and that the demand would eventually decline with peace. The plan is rather dismissive of them, suggesting that they be dispersed within the residential areas, as their concentration had 'negligible, if any, amenity value' (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, 39-40) . HLG 79/375, 1943-4; NA HLG 79/376, 1943-6) . Important individual and social actors also supported the scheme (see, for instance, Lanchester, 1943, 41) , or even encouraged a larger amount of green space. They included the Chief Officer of the Parks Department, who was delighted with the plan; the RIBA, which considered four acres reasonable provided that an additional three acres were added in the outer zone; the Minister of Town and Country Planning, who welcomed the proposal and suggested that the amount of green space should even be increased to more than four acres wherever possible; the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, asking for allotments to be considered in addition to the four-acre standard; or the TCPA, who thought that the four-acre standard was far too low (LMA CL/TP/1/34, 1943b, 3; see also Reiss, 1943, 254 and Cracknell, 1943, 118) .
However, on the other side of the spectrum, there were those more directly involved with financial matters in the LCC who would cry for restraint. The green-wedge based park system in the County of London Plan acted as a precursor to the Greater London Plan 1944. The county plan set forward the principle of articulating a closely linked park system from neighbourhood to regional scale. It converted the wedge-like gaps between development along traffic lines and river valleys as the basis upon which to build a comprehensive system of greenery. The solution for the lack of green spaces was to increase the County's baseline ratio to seven acres per 1,000 inhabitants-which, as discussed above, was severely questioned-while dealing with their ill distribution involved the elaboration of a plan. Green wedges were the driving force behind the park system plan.
The Greater London Plan 1944: green wedges and the quest for regional planning
The Greater London Plan was the chance to resolve the inter-war quest for regionalism. Soon after the LCC started working on its plan, discussions about the need to plan regionally started to emerge. In September 1941, in a meeting that included Abercrombie, Pepler and Forshaw, it was noted that the 'outside authorities were highly suspicious' of the LCC plan (NA HLG 71/116, 1941c) . To avoid a multitude of local authorities' plans, it was agreed that 'the plan must be prepared by one mind giving whole time attention to it' and that the Ministry should ask Abercrombie to carry out a plan over the Greater London area on behalf of the Standing Conference on London Regional Planning (NA HLG 71/116, 1941a, 1; see also NA HLG 71/116, 1941b; The Builder, 1942a, 563) . Upon the publication of the County of London Plan, Silkin (1943, 5 ) stated how difficult the task had been, as the authors suffered from the fact that they were restricted to making proposals only within the 'arbitrarily created' borders of the county, excluding also the jurisdiction of the City Corporation.
The general ideas of population relocation beyond the outer green belt, control of London's growth and the improvement of inner city standards were developed and embraced more fully in the Greater London Plan 1944. This plan assumed that Greater London's population would not increase above the 1938 figure of about ten million people and that decentralisation should occur by relocating a million people from the inner ring to expanded towns and eight new satellite towns, which were to be built 50 miles away from London's core.
Sprawl was to be controlled by creating a green belt on the 1939 urban fringe.
Abercrombie proposed establishing four rings to structure the general master plan, the first encompassing the inner central area, the second circling London at around 12 miles from Charing Cross, the third being the 'Green Belt Ring', with a mix of playing fields and farms, and the fourth the 'Outer Country Ring'. In addition, the transformation of the existing city should happen mainly by improvements made to the traffic system, the formation of self-sufficient communities and the provision of a comprehensive park system.
The park system plan for Greater London was considerably more elaborate than that of the County plan. It prescribed a standard of ten acres per 1,000 people, as opposed to the seven-acre standard proposed by the County plan. The proposal for Greater London also presented a more developed description of the system's main ambitions, functions and components.
The overarching principles of using green spaces to provide salubrious spaces for recreation, to create continuous connections to the countryside and define selfsufficient communities were pursued. It must be remembered that one of Abercrombie's reoccurring core preoccupations regarding the provision of a park system for London's region was the lack of connectivity between the built-up centre and the verge of the urbanised area. Making use of Howard's term, he assumed that the country was the real 'magnet' attracting Londoners. This would generate a 'centrifugal urge to fly from bricks and mortar and get into the country' (Abercrombie, 1945, 97; NA HLC 85/17, 1944) . The need for access to the countryside was a common preoccupation at the time, as can be seen in a report from 14 January 1944 arguing that London's lack of green spaces had reached a point that required 'taking children out in buses to Outer London to see its green fields'. This would be a 'further indication of the necessity of keeping Outer London's open spaces free of building' (NA HLC 85/17, 1944, 2) . Consequently, green wedges were at the core of the proposed park system as the most appropriate typology of green space to facilitate the achievement of such an objective. They were referred to as 'interpenetrating wedges of varied open land' (Abercrombie, 1945, 103) . Any land leading from the heart of London to the open country that was considered to be essential for the creation of these green wedges should be bought on similar lines as suggested by the Uthwatt Report, be kept free from building and be open to the public.
The park system plan would consist of a range of typologies from the small scale of playgrounds and town squares to the large scale of green wedges and green belts.
The idea of allowing residents to go from their house in the inner city to the open countryside through green spaces-formerly put forward in the County of London plan-was pursued. Abercrombie alerted the reader that many green wedges could have been created in the past, but little had been done in this respect. He warned that the clock was ticking and it was time to act. As envisaged by Unwin in the final report of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (1929), Abercrombie (1945, 100 ) pictured a protected green canvas as the base for the plan, rather than a sea of buildings with scattered green spaces.
INSERT FIG. 7 HERE (Greater London open spaces plan)
Twenty-four green wedges connecting the first and the third rings of the plan were proposed (see Figure 7 ). They were described in Appendix 20 of the plan. It is worth noting that the plan had only two appendices that referred to green spaces: 'Open Spaces Survey and Proposals' (Appdx 19) and 'Green Wedges-Proposals' (Appdx 20). Curiously enough, there was no appendix for green belts, which indicates something of the importance that Abercrombie attached to the wedges and their implementation. The wedges ranged from long to short, continuous to broken and were, as much as possible, to be converted into public recreation zones and playing fields. The wedges from the County of London Plan were all present, to which eleven more were added, including the River Thames, 'the finest natural wedge into London' (Abercrombie, 1945, 207-8) . River valleys were to be used as such throughout Greater London, as they were considered to be 'very valuable as green wedges of lungs to towns in their vicinity'. In addition, they were also of 'great value in maintaining the physical separation between expanding communities, and thereby helping to maintain and emphasise their independent community life' (NA HLC 85/17, 1944, 5) .
With regard to the plan's position in respect to agricultural land, it referred to the Scott Report and stated that farmland would not all be under green belt influence, but also referred to the 'wedges penetrating into the Suburban Ring' (Abercrombie, 1945, 103-4 ; see also letter from Dudley Stamp to Abercombie: NA HLG 71/116, 1944).
The Scott report discussed distinct views on the idea of green belt and made a direct reference to green wedges. From the perspective of the urban dweller the green belt, the report argued, was considered to be 'a belt of open land-of commons, woods, fields-to be "preserved" from buildings and so to serve as an encircling ring of green round the smoke and dirt of the town, perhaps with "wedges" of green penetrating towards the heart of the town itself'. It suggested, on the other hand, that these wedges be understood 'as a tract of the countryside', and used for the production of fresh produce and for the reservation of woodland (Ministry of Works and Planning, 1942, 71) . Despite the call for seeing green wedges as tracts of rural land, the plan tended to promote the wedges mostly as parkland.
By this time, large open spaces were seen as worthy allies in times of war.
Abercrombie, in his plan for Plymouth published in 1943, stated that 'parks and town gardens could withstand bombing and fire better than our solid buildings' and that war had brought forward the advantage of more spacious planning, which would lessen the effect of aerial attack and provide emergency land that could be converted into allotments to reinforce food supplies (Watson and Abercrombie, 1943, 98-9) .
Green wedges, as instruments of 'spacious' planning, in this respect, would help break up the mass of buildings, minimise the proliferation of fire, increase the dissipation of smoke, provide escape routes and congregation points in the event of attack, and be available for temporary conversion into allotments. The reception of these two plans in newspapers and professional journals tended to be minimal and mostly descriptive (Larkham and Lilley, 2001, 8, 11 and 16 ; see for instance The Estates Gazette, 1944, 550-1; The Builder, 1944, 465-9) . Critical assertions about the provision of green spaces being insufficient can be found for both plans, as revealed by an article by M. Cracknell from the TCPA regarding the LCC plan, which stated that the plan was unacceptable as it stood and that the provision of green spaces should be much increased (1943, 118) ; and by E.C. Kent and F.J.
Samuely's review of the Greater London Plan, which argued that 'a more radical policy would have been welcome ' (1945, 324) . On the matter of green wedges, Kent and Samuely used an image of the Lee Valley green wedge from the Greater London Plan as an example of Abercrombie's approach. The Town Planning Review, in turn, considered the articulation of traffic arteries and green spaces marking the boundaries of districts as 'the one recent great advance in the theory of the modern city' (W.A.E., 1943-7, 39 ). Despite Abercrombie's and Silkin's efforts to call attention to the green wedges and to keep them building-free, the idealism behind the possibility of radically transforming London was eventually shaken by legal constraints and lack of funding.
Despite the fact that the formation of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning in 1943 meant a move towards the coordination of planning also at national level, the 1943 and 1944 Town and Country Planning Acts, which gave new powers to local authorities for the acquisition of land, were perceived as unsatisfactory (Hasegawa, 1992, 5-6; Hasegawa, 1999) . As Tichelar described, the 1944 Act in particular was considered by many local authorities as a 'great betrayal' and a 'triumph of the rights of property' (Cited in Essex and Brayshay, 2008, 444) . With the end of the war, the economic crisis and the consequent limitation in funding for the realisation of the two plans analysed in this article, the focus was on the overwhelming need for housing and other aspects of reconstruction.
Contrary to what could have been expected due to the slim chances of implementing green wedges in London immediately after the war, the idea would gain another boost nationally and internationally in the wake of the Greater London Plan.
In this respect, it is worth noting that the use of green wedges became a recommendation of the 'Final Report of the New Towns Committee' (New Towns Committee, 1946, paragraph 60) . Indeed, many plans for new towns adopted the use of green wedges in their park systems, as for instance, Harlow, Stevenage and Hemel Hempstead. Interestingly enough, the most emblematic post-war period implementation of the green wedges idea happened outside Britain, with the 1947
Finger Plan for Copenhagen (see Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2002, 205-6; Vejre et al., 2007, 311-28) .
Conclusions
The war brought with it the feeling that the time had come to end the negative effects of unplanned growth. The responsibility of implementing radical change lay with town planning, which now had to confront the enormous challenge of replanning and reconstruction. These two plans should be viewed in the broader context of the postwar reconstruction debate. They emphasised that the benefits of radical reconstruction would greatly outweigh, in the long term, the enormous costs of demolition and building the new London.
Green wedges had four main raisons d'être. First, they had a sanitary role in bringing sunlight, fresh air and greenery to the inner parts of the city. Second, and perhaps most importantly, in a period when the countryside was increasingly distant from the city's core, these wedges allowed a direct link from the centre to the open country through pleasant green routes. Third, they were to provide easy access to open space, mainly recreational grounds, to every citizen. And lastly, they were instruments of planning, inasmuch as they could be used as zoning tools to connect or separate areas.
Other functions were attached to the wedges, or some that already existed were elaborated. First of all, green wedges became symbols of hope for a better and brighter future. At the same time as they opened up a physical path to the now remote countryside, they were also allegories of the search for a balanced society in harmonious contact with nature. Another specific contribution of the post-war context was the growing importance of open space in times of conflict. 'Spacious' planning was seen as a pre-emptive move against air raids and the demise of large populations.
Green wedges would then help avoid the proliferation of fire in the city, as well as serve as congregation points and escape routes. In this context, they could also become temporary allotments to support food supply. With the national preoccupation with agricultural land and the need to consider town and country planning jointly in the 1940s, discourses about considering the wedges as tracts of nature or agricultural land arriving from beyond the urban fringe became stronger, and was particularly evident in the Greater London Plan. An elaboration of a previous function can be seen in the growing importance of wedges in zoning, particularly in their use as buffer zones between traffic arteries and residential areas, and as boundaries of communities.
Another important inference that can be made is that green wedges worked both at the city and regional scales, as anchors of the city in the territory. Ultimately, with the assumption of the creation of new towns around London, green wedges could assume a national dimension by interconnecting them with the capital and beyond.
There is a lack of immediate reactions to green wedges, both contemporary and in later evaluations of post-war reconstruction plans. As discussed, commentators tended not to focus on this aspect of park systems. It could be said that this may be due to the fact that out of all the planning debates, not much was implemented, with the exception of the green belt.
Although green wedges had been discussed by British planners for decades, few examples of their implementation could be seen. If green wedges were to go from the open country to the inner core, they needed to cut through numerous privately owned properties and administrative boundaries. These, coupled with difficulty in controlling intra-urban development, problematised their planning and most of all any attempt at their potential execution. Competing plans happening at the same time with different objectives were not uncommon, and while overall plans expected a conjoined strategy for London, boroughs and individual landowners proved to have other priorities. The immediate urge for houses also contributed to diverting the focus away from the provision of such large green spaces. Moreover, the lack of a legal apparatus and the economic crises that came with the end of the war added to the problems that needed to be overcome to implement green wedges in London.
Notwithstanding that the idea did not materialise in the capital as planned, green wedges gained a boost of popularity in the new towns. Being able to plan from scratch, with the support of the New Towns Committee, and to count on the economic and legal powers bestowed upon the new towns' corporations undoubtedly helped make green wedges a reality.
Trying to understand the post-war reconstruction debates without considering the significance that contemporary planners gave to green wedges is to see only a partial picture of the multifaceted nature of what planning for the future really meant. As we have seen here, green wedges were at the core of what London should be like today.
